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Fighting for the fourth "R" 
"Courts" said 
' one decision, 
"are not equipped 
to act as 
school boards." 
based practices. The Establisment 
Clause, in part, bars the state from 
fostering an excessive government 
entanglement with religion. The 
Fourteenth Amendment, through its 
extension of due process re-
quirements to the states, protects 
the rights of parents to direct the up-
bringing of their children. 
Th€ test normally applied in deter-
mining whether regulation of relig-
iously motivated conduct violates 
the free exercise clause requires a 
three-part determination: 
(1) whether the challenge is 
motivated by, and rooted in, a 
legitimately and sincerely held 
rei igious belief; 
(2) whether and to what extent 
state regulations burden free 
exercise rights; and 
(3) whether any such burden 
is justified by a sufficiently 
compelling state interest. Ban-
gor Baptist Church v. State, 549 
F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (D.Me. 
1982) (Summary Judgment 
refused). 
Government regulation which 
significantly burdens the free exer-
cise of religion cannot withstand 
constitutional challenge unless it 
represents "the least restrictive 
means to achieve some compelling 
state interest." Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981 ). But 
the exemption of a religious activity 
from regulation is not constitution-
ally required where it would "unduly 
interfere with fulfillment of the 
(compelling) government interest." 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982). 
On this issue, Christian educators 
claim that 3 constitutionally unjusti-
fiable stranglehold is being placed 
on their rei igious I iberty by state 
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laws and bureaucracies. Christian 
educators believe that private rei ig-
ious schools are mandated by God. 
This belief on the part of Christian 
educators, that education is inherent-
ly religious, demands noncompliance 
with state licensing procedures 
which grant broad authority to state 
boards of education to promulgate 
"equivalent educational standards" 
for nonpubl ic schools. Most Christian 
educators acknowledge, however, 
that some limited state regulation is 
appropriate to ensure that students 
learn basic subject areas in a healthy 
environment. See generally Carper, 
"The Christian Day School Move-
ment," 47 Educational Forum 135 
(Winter 1983) 
State officials contend that they 
have broad authority to promulgate 
"reasonable" educational standards 
in private schools. Noting Supreme 
Court decisions that held "education 
[to be] the most important function 
of the state and local governments," 
states frequently claim that expan-
sive regulations are the least intru-
sive means available to satisfy their 
compelling interest in the education 
of the young. Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
State legislators have enacted, to 
varying degrees, regulations which 
require private sectarian schools to 
satisfy minimum standards in the 
following areas: (1) fire, health, and 
safety; (2) curriculm; (3) textbook se-
lection; (4) instructional time; (5) 
teacher certification; (6) zoning; 
(7) consumer protection; (8) student 
reporting; (9) testing; (10) state licen-
sing; (11) community interaction, 
and (12) guidance services. The most 
controversial of these regulations 
are programmatic ones which govern 
actual teaching practices in nonpub-
lic schools, including curriculum, 
textbook. and teacher certification 
In addit1on to raising issues under 
the free exercise clause, state regu-
lations frequently conflict with the 
Establishment Clause prohibition of 
excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion. If Christian edu-
cators can demonstrate expansive 
government involvement in the daily 
operations of their schools, the state 
must prove that its regulatory 
scheme meets the least restrictive 
means-compelling interest test. In 
denying the state's summary judment 
motion in Bangor Baptist Church v. 
State, the Maine U.S. District Court 
discussed the importance of the ex-
cessive entanglement concept in Es-
tablishment Clause litigation: 
An unconstitutional entangle-
ment generally involves the 
government's continuing moni-
toring or potential for regulat-
ing the religious activity under 
scrutiny. 
. In determining whether 
there is entanglement, the ques-
tion is "whether particular acts 
in question are intended to es-
tablish or interfere with rei ig-
ious beliefs of practices or have 
the effect of doing so." 549 F. 
Supp. at 1221 (citations omit-
ted). 
The excessive entanglement prong 
of the Establishment Clause test is 
often viewed as a list of prohibited 
entanglements-that government 
may not: 
(1) involve itself in "continuing 
day-to-day relationships" with such 
pervasively religious schools; 
(2) have relationships with church-
schools which involve an "element 
of governmental evaluation and stan-
dards;" 
(3) carry out legislation or regula-
tions which create situations readily 
leading to "confrontations and con-
flicts" between government and 
churches; 
(4) have "programs whose very 
nature is apt to entangle the state in 
details of administration;" 
(5) have a "sustained and detailed 
relationship [with church institutions] 
for enforcement of statutory and ad-
minstrative standards;" 
(6) employ, in respect to relation· 
ships between teachers and children 
in church-schools, "comprehensive 
methods of surveillance and control;" 
(7) engage in inspection of church 
institutional records; 
(8) carry out legislation or regula-
tions which create situation requiring 
"negotiations" between church in-
stitutions which have even the "po-
tential" for the foregoing entangle-
ments. 
W. Ball, Memorandum to Our Fund-
amentalist Christian Friends and 
Other Friends of Religious Liberty, 
App. 14, 1981, at 3-4. 
Neal Devins 
HEAL THY IDEAS: IRR RESOLUTION PASSED 
The ABA House of Delegates, act-
ing on the recommendation of the 
Section of Individual Rights and 
Responsibilities, has approved a 
resolution on "the importation of 
ideas and information" into the 
United States. Approval of the res-
olution at the 1985 Midyear Meet-
ing followed submission of a larger 
I RR Section recommendation con-
cerning U.S. policy on information 
and the issuance of visas to visiting 
scholars and political activists. 
The delegates approved a reso-
lution stating that "the American 
Bar Association recommends that 
U.S. pol icy concerning the importa-
tion of ideas and information be 
guided by the following principle: 
"There should be no prohibition 
on the import into the United States 
of ideas and information if the cir-
culation of the ideas and informa-
tion in the United States is pro-
tected by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution. However, this 
principle would not preclude (a) 
labeling requirements as to the 
source of information; (b) restric-
tions on quantities of material that 
Prior court decisions on the state 
regulation issue suggest that the out-
come of lawsuits involving state reg-
ulation of Christian schools often 
hinge on whether the courts prefer 
unrestrained parental choice in edu-
cation or state control over some of 
the essential components of Christian 
education. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court, for example, held state teacher 
certification requirements unconsti-
tutional in its 1979 State v. Rudasill 
decision. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1 979). 
For that court: 
One other issue involved in 
lawsuits between Christian 
educators and the state is the right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children. One of the leading 
court decisions that supports the 
position of Christian educators is the 
Supreme Court's '1925 Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters decision. In it, the 
Court explicitly recognized the (due 
process) right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children. 268 U.S. 
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a foreign power may import into 
the United States; or (c) procedures 
to screen incoming materials to 
determine if their circulation is 
restricted by law within the United 
States." 
In its report, the I RR Section 
quoted President Ronald Reagan: 
"Expanding contacts across borders 
and permitting a free exchange or 
interchange of information and 
ideas increase confidence; sealing 
off one's people from the rest of the 
world reduces it." 
"A free flow of information," the 
report said, "and ideas among 
American citizens is crucial to the 
health of our democratic society. 
Through open and ro.bust debate in 
the 'marketplace of ideas,' Ameri-
can citizens inform themselves of 
policy choices which shape and af-
fect their lives. The flow of infor-
mation in and out of the United 
States is an important part of this 
exchange. Moreover," the report 
submitted to the house said, "inter-
national obligations of the United 
States commit us to faciliate the 
flow of information." 
510 (1 925). The Pierce Court held un-
constitutional an Oregon statute 
which required all children to attend 
public schools. The Court ruled that 
the State could not outlaw private 
schooling and that 
[t]he fundamental theory of lib-
erty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose, ex-
cludes any general power over 
the state to standardize its 
children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from pub I ic 
teachers only. The child is not 
the mere creature of the State; 
those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations. 268 U.S. 
at 535. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court sim-
ilarly ruled that Amish parents have 
a First Amendment religious I iberty 
right to remove their teenage chii-
(P/ease turn to page 52) 
fighting for the fourth "R" (Continued from page 35) 
dren from public schools. 406 U.S. 
205 (1972). According to the Court: 
"[t]he history and culture of Western 
civilization reflect a strong tradition 
of parental concern for the nurture 
and upbringing of their children. This 
primary role of the parents in the up-
bringing of their children is now es-
tablished beyond debate as an en-
during American tradition." 406 U.S. 
at 232. The Court further noted that 
the parent's right to prepare his child 
for additional obligations extended 
to "the inculcation of moral stan-
dards, religious beliefs, and elements 
of good citizenship." 406 U.S. at 233. 
Finally, in the case of Free Exercise 
challenges, the Court held that par-
ental decisions must be respected 
unless it appears that these decisions 
"will jeopardize the health or safety 
of the child or have a potential for 
significant social burdens." 406 U.S. 
at 234. As the Court stated in Prince 
v. Massachusetts: "[i]t is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care, and 
nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for ob-
I igations the state can neither supply 
nor hinder." 321 U.S.158, 166(1944). 
These decisions, however, should 
not be interpreted to give parents 
carte blanche authority over their 
children's educations. In fact, the 
Prince court acknowledged: 
No question is raised concerning 
the power of the State reason-
ably to regulate all schools, to 
inspect, supervise and examine 
them, their teachers and pupils; 
to require that all children of 
proper age attend some school, 
that teachers shall be of good 
moral character and patriotic 
disposition, that certain studies 
plainly essential to good citi-
zenship must be taught, and that 
nothing be taught which is man-
ifestly inimical to the public 
welfare. 268 U.S. at 534. 
Presently, the Supreme Court explic-
itly recognizes the constitutionality 
of reasonable state regulations of 
private schools which promote a 
compelling state interest in educa-
tion. In Board of Education v. Allen, 
for example, the Court observed that: 
[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body 
of case law has confirmed the 
power of the States to insist that 
attendance at private schools, 
if it is to satisfy state compul-
sory-attendance laws, be at in-
52 
stitutions which provide mml-
mum hours of instruction, 
employ teachers of specified 
training, and cover prescribed 
subjects of instruction. 392 U.S. 
236, 245-247 (1968). 
In other words, "if the State must sat-
isfy its interest in secular education 
through the instrument of private 
schools, it has a proper interest in the 
manner in which those schools per-
form their secular educational func-
tion." Allen at 247. Numerous other 
Supreme Court decisions have rec-
ognized the rights of states to impose 
reasonable regulations on its private 
schools. But the Supreme Court has 
yet to determine where the line sep-
arating reasonable from unreason-
able state regulations should be 
drawn. 
[i]t cannot be said as an absolute 
that a teacher in a nonpublic 
school ... will be unable to in-
struct children to become intel-
ligent citizens ... [T]he receipt 
of 'a bachelor's degree from a 
standard college or university' 
is an indicator of the level of 
achievement, but it is not a sine 
qua non the absence of which 
establishes that private and pa-
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rachial school teachers are un-
able to teach their students to 
intelligently exercise the elec-
tive franchise. 589 S.W.2d at 884. 
The Ohio Supreme Court and a Mich-
igan trial court have similarly held 
such certification requirements un-
constitutional. State (of Ohio) v. 
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181 (1976), 
State(of Michigan) v. Nobel, S-7-91-
0114-A (Allegan Cty., Mich.) In the 
Ohio case, the court noted: 
In the face of the record before 
us, and in light of the expert tes-
timony, [l]t is difficult to imagine 
a state interest of sufficient 
magnitude to override the inter-
est claiming protection under 
the free exercise clause ... We 
shall not, therefore, attempt to 
conjure up such an interest in 
order to sustain application of 
the 'minimum standards' to 
these appellants. 47 Ohio St. 2d 
at217-218. 
In stark contradiction to these de-
cisions, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
upheld a teacher certification re-
quirement in State v. Faith Baptist 
Church, 301 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb.1981 ). 
301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981 ). That 
court thought that: 
it cannot be fairly disputed that 
such a requirement is neither ar-
bitrary nor unreasonable. 
[A]dditionally, we believe it is 
also a reliable indicator or the 
probability of success in that 
particular field. We believe that 
it goes without saying that the 
State has a compelling interest 
in the quality and ability of those 
who are to teach its young peo-
ple. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in 
reaching the same conclusion, ap-
proached the teacher certification 
issue in a different manner. For that 
court: 
courts are ill-equipped to act as 
school boards and determine 
the need for discrete aspects of 
a compulsory school education 
program. The Courtroom is 
simply not the best arena for the 
debate of issues of educational 
policy and the measurement of 
educational equality. Although 
North Dakota's minimal require-
ment for state approval of a pri-
vate or parochial school may be 
imperfect, without the regula-
tions the state would have no 
reasonable assurance that its 
recognized interest in providing 
an education for its youth is 
being protected. State v. Shaver, 
294 N.W.2d 883, 899-980 (N.D. 
1980). 
A North Carolina trial court also up-
held state teacher certification pro-
cedures as "[a necessary means] to 
insure that the child receives [essen-
tial] skills." State v. Columbus Chris-
tian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678 at 14 
(Wake County Super. Ct.). 
This variance among court deci-
sions can be attributed to a number 
of factors. The most significant is 
that Supreme Court decisions on the 
parent-child-state issue are suffi-
ciently diverse to support lower 
courts in their decisions to either 
uphold or invalidate state regulatory 
schemes. Consequently, judges were 
able to find precedential support to 
justify apparent value preferences. 
Moreover, litigants in these lawsuits 
fed the possibility of such judicial 
bais by failing to adequately present 
their cases before the courts. 
Bangor Baptist and Sheridan Road 
are especially important cases 
because they represent the most ex-
tensive trials on the religious 
freedom issue in the Christian school 
context to have taken place. In the 
past, Christian school lawsuits have 
been characterized by poor lawyer-
ing on the part of some state pro-
secutors and Christian school at-
torneys. Consequently, previous 
court decisions frequently did not 
address legal issues in a defintive 
matter because attorneys failed 
either to introduce evidence to sup-
port their claims, or raise legal argu-
ments which would support their 
position. See T. Minnery, "Does 
David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as 
He Preaches Church-State Separa-
tion?," Christianity Today, November 
12,1982 at 48. 
The Bangor Baptist case is also sig-
nificant because it is the first Chris-
tian school lawsuit to be resolved by 
a federal district court. All previous 
Christian school cases were initiated 
in state courts. The Bangor Baptist 
decision thus stands as a unique pre-
cedent. This is particularly important 
because federal court opinions are 
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An important issue 
involved in lawsuits 
between Christian 
educators and the 
state is the right 
of parents to direct 
the upbringing of 
their children 
Fighting for the fourth 11R" 
generally accorded more preceden-
tial value than out-of-state court de-
cisions. What this means is that Chris-
tian school attorneys will emphasize 
their legal victory in Maine in forth-
coming lawsuits with other states. 
It is important, however, to realize 
the possible limitations of the Bangor 
Baptist case. Judge Cyr's ruling was 
based on statutory grounds, not con-
stitutional grounds. Since Maine's 
statutory scheme varies in significant 
respects from regulatory schemes of 
other states, the Bangor Baptist de-
cision does not directly repudiate 
the authority of state officials to pro-
mulgate teacher certification, cur-
riculm, and many other types of 
regulations. Instead, Judge Cyr 
merely held that Maine education 
officials were without statutory au-
thority to shut down unaccredited 
church schools. 
Judge Cyr found controlling the 
fact that no Maine law "prohibits pri-
vate schools from operating merely 
because they are unapproved or re-
fuse to seek or accept approval." 
The judge felt that "[i]f the legislature 
had meant to ban the operation of un-
approved private schools, 'it would 
have said so in the clear and unmis-
takable language."' Rather, Cyr 
noted that Maine's compulsory edu-
cation law establishes an elaborate 
plan for prosecuting individuals re-
sponsible for keeping students out 
of school. Consequently, he con-
cluded that if the state were to shut 
down the schools, "the administra-
tive safeguards of notice, hearing 
and conciliation" of the truancy pro-
cess would be eliminated. 
The limited statutory nature of the 
Bangor Baptist decision should not 
severely diminish its value as a pre-
cedent in future Christian school law-
suits, however. Judge Cyr's decision 
suggests that even if state officials 
had statutory authority to shut down 
unaccredited Christian schools, 
"grave constitutional problems" and 
"serious constitutional difficulties" 
would be raised relating to religious 
I iberty, rights of enterprise and prior 
restraints on First Amendment liber-
ties. In fact, in October 1982, Judge 
Cyr refused on First Amendment 
grounds to grant the state the right to 
shut down Maine's unaccredited 
Christian schools without a trial on 
the merits. Apparently, Judge Cyr 
based his recent decision on statu-
tory grounds because of the Supreme 
Court's admonition to, whenever 
possible, avoid constitutional deter-
minations. 
The State of Maine did not appeal 
the Bangor Baptist ruling. 
Unlike the Bangor Baptist case, 
the Sheridan Road court resolved the 
constitutional issue presented to it. 
That court upheld- on constitution-
al grounds-regulations quite sim-
ilarto those utilized in Maine. Instead 
of viewing this regu Ia tory scheme to 
be of dubious constitutional validity, 
the Michigan Court concluded: "that 
any burden [that state procedures 
place on the religious] beliefs [of 
Christian educators] is not constitu-
tionally significant." These educators 
had alleged that state teacher certi-
fication and licensing requirements 
unjustifiably burdened their right to 
religious liberty. Additionally, Mich-
igan's Christian educators contended 
that state requirements infringed on 
the due process rights of parents to 
direct the upbringing of their 
children. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals did 
not deny that the state interfered 
with constitutional rights of Michi-
gan's Christian educators. Yet, since 
Christian educators did not object to 
having their children taught by certi-
fied teachers who shared religious 
beliefs similar to their own, the Sher-
idan Road court concluded that 
"[t]here is no showing that compli-
ance with the requirement would 
render, the [religious] mission of 
[these] schools impractical or impos-
sible." 
Combined with this ruling that only 
a "minimal burden" was placed on 
religious beliefs, the Michigan court 
validated state officials' contentions 
that their laws and regulations are a 
necessary and unobtrusive means to 
ensure that their youth receive an 
adequate education. In so doing, the 
court dismissed as irrelevant 
evidence proffered by Christian 
educators which indicated that their 
children performed as well on nation-
ally recognized achievement tests as 
did their public school counterparts. 
Significantly, the state court of ap-
peals also sought to distinguish its 
ruling from state court decisions in 
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Kentucky (Rudasill) and Ohio (Whis-
ner) which upheld the rights of Chris-
tian educators on constitutional 
grounds; noting that in Kentucky a 
constitutional provision unique to 
that state was at issue and in Ohio 
the state regulations were so intrusive 
as to "make meaningless" the rights 
of parents to direct their children's 
rei igious upbringing. 
The Michigan Supreme Court 
refused to review this ruling. 
The Sheridan Road and Bangor Bap-
tist decision provide a mixed message 
to both state legislators and Christian 
educators. On the one hand, Bangor 
Baptist suggests that state efforts to 
extensively regulate schools might be 
foreclosed by legal action. On the 
other hand, Sheridan Road indicates 
that state officials have great leeway 
in their development of regulations 
which govern the operation of church-
affiliated private schools. 
At this juncture, it is impossible to 
determine which of the two decisions 
is more significant. Although the 
Bangor Baptist case was decided by 
a more influential court, the decision 
did not directly address the case's re-
ligious liberty issue. The Sheridan 
Road decision, however, is of limited 
precedential value since it was not 
affirmed by the Michigan Supreme 
Court. 
Both decisions, however, point to 
the need for some definitive resolu-
tion of the Christian school issue. 
Over the past five years, at least 16 
state courts have issued decisions on 
this matter. These decisions, as a 
whole, are quite inconclusive as to 
the rights and responsibilities of both 
the state and Christian educators. 
This varied body of court decisions 
suggest that this issue will remain un-
resolved until the U.S. Supreme Court 
addresses this matter. hr 
The ABA Commission on Legal Prob-
lems of the Elderly has published a 
monograph describing the private 
law practice of serving the elderly. 
Copies of the publication, "Doing 
Well by Doing Good: Providing 
Legal Services to the Elderly in a 
Paying Practice," are available free 
from the Commission on Legal 
Problems of the Elderly, ABA, 1800 
M St. N.W., Washington, DC 20036. 
